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Context: The robust relationship between socioeconomic factors and health
suggests that social and economic policies might substantially affect health,
while other evidence suggests that medical care, the main focus of current
health policy, may not be the primary determinant of population health. Income
support policies are one promising avenue to improve population health. This
study examines whether the federal cash transfer program to poor elderly, the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, affects old-age disability.
Methods: This study uses the 1990 and 2000 censuses, employing state and
year fixed-effect models, to test whether within-state changes in maximum SSI
benefits over time lead to changes in disability among people aged sixty-five
and older.
Findings: Higher benefits are linked to lower disability rates. Among all sin-
gle elderly individuals, 30 percent have mobility limitations, and an increase
of $100 per month in the maximum SSI benefit caused the rate of mobil-
ity limitations to fall by 0.46 percentage points. The findings were robust to
sensitivity analyses. First, analyses limited to those most likely to receive SSI
produced larger effects, but analyses limited to those least likely to receive SSI
produced no measurable effect. Second, varying the disability measure did not
meaningfully alter the findings. Third, excluding the institutionalized, immi-
grants, individuals living in states with exceptionally large benefit changes,
and individuals living in states with no SSI supplements did not change the
substantive conclusions. Fourth, Medicaid did not confound the effects. Finally,
these results were robust for married individuals.
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Conclusions: Income support policy may be a significant new lever for improv-
ing population health, especially that of lower-income persons. Even though
the findings are robust, further analyses are needed to confirm their reliability.
Future research should examine a variety of different income support policies,
as well as whether a broader range of social and economic policies affect health.
Keywords: Disability, Supplemental Security Income, income support policy.
In 1982, the BLACK REPORT found that universal healthcare in the United Kingdom, which had been in place for morethan twenty-five years, had done little to decrease disparities in
morbidity and mortality by social class (Black et al. 1982). These find-
ings stimulated more than two decades of research documenting a nearly
universal relationship between socioeconomic status and health, which
have led to theories that socioeconomic status is a fundamental cause
of health (House, Kessler, and Herzog 1990; Link and Phelan 1995).
Fundamental cause theorists argue that policy solutions need to focus on
upstream factors—such as changes in social and economic policies—as
much as or more than on downstream factors—such as health care and
behavioral changes (Graham 2004; Herd, Goesling, and House 2007;
House, Kessler, and Herzog 1990; Link and Phelan 1995; Schoeni et al.
Forthcoming). They point not only to the findings from the Black Re-
port but also to the growing evidence that medical care accounts for
only a limited portion of the variance in population health (McGinnis,
Williams-Russo, and Knickman 2002).
To date, however, very few studies have examined whether upstream
solutions—particularly social and economic policies—affect health. Ex-
amination of such effects can provide additional and, in certain ways,
stronger, evidence that social and economic factors are significant up-
stream determinants of health. Furthermore, even if there were causal
certainty that income affected health, which is still debated (e.g., Adams
et al. 2003), we cannot assume that income support policies would affect
health. Policies have multiple goals and, more often than not, unintended
effects. This makes it necessary to analyze whether specific policies have
specific health effects.
In this study, we examine the effects of one important upstream factor:
income support policy. In particular, we analyze the Supplemental Secu-
rity Income (SSI) program, which is targeted at raising the incomes of the
poorest elderly Americans. Analyzing the health effects of SSI benefits
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is useful for substantive and methodological reasons. Past research has
generally found a nonlinear relationship between income and health in
the United States, particularly in relationship to morbidity; the rela-
tionship is stronger for those at the bottom of the income distribution
(Backlund, Sorlie, and Johnson 1996; House, Kessler, and Herzog 1990;
House et al. 1994; McDonough et al. 1997). There is more conflicting
evidence about the relationship between income and health at the top
end of the income distribution than at the bottom end (Benzeval, Judge,
and Shouls 2001; Bassuk, Berkman, and Amick 2002; Ellison 2002;
Martikainen et al. 2001; Norris et al. 2003). Thus, it makes the most
sense to examine policies that focus on those at the bottom of the income
distribution, such as SSI, which provides a guaranteed minimum income
for the poorest elderly Americans. Another advantage of concentrating
on SSI is that its maximum allowable benefits vary significantly not
only between states at a given time but also within states over time.
This variation in policy can plausibly be assumed to be exogenous to the
health of the elderly, thus allowing us to test the impact on disability
of changing benefit levels within states over time. Using the 1990 and
2000 censuses, we examine the within-state variation in SSI benefits over
time to see whether they affect within-state changes in disability among
the elderly. We begin by reviewing the limited empirical research that




The fundamental cause hypothesis posits that socioeconomic status is
not simply a determinant of health differences but is a “fundamen-
tal cause” of these differences. Over the past thirty years, sociologists
and epidemiologists documenting the consistent and inverse relation-
ship between socioeconomic status and measures of both morbidity and
mortality across time, across countries, and across the life course be-
gan to challenge the notion that socioeconomic position was simply
a proxy for other factors that negatively affect health, such as access
to health care, sedentary lifestyles, smoking, and obesity (Adler et al.
1994; House et al. 1994; Lantz et al. 1998; Link and Phelan 1995).
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The key evidence supporting fundamental cause theory is that even
though the intervening links between socioeconomic status and health
have changed over time, the link between low socioeconomic status
and poor health has not changed. For example, while the major causes
of mortality have changed over the twentieth century, from infectious
disease to chronic conditions, socioeconomic disparities in health have
either persisted or increased (Link and Phelan 1995; Pappas et al. 1993).
In addition, the strong link between socioeconomic status and health
persists across countries with vastly different social, political, and eco-
nomic institutions (World Health Organization 2006) and across the life
course within a given country (Herd 2006; House, Kessler, and Herzog
1990).
The policy implication of fundamental cause theory is to place greater
emphasis than currently is placed on upstream factors like social and eco-
nomic status. Fundamental cause theory emphasizes that socioeconomic
position shapes access to resources that help individuals avoid risk fac-
tors for disease and mortality (House, Kessler, and Herzog 1990; Link
and Phelan 1995). For example, in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, wealthier individuals could avoid the kinds of crowded housing
conditions that increased risk for infectious disease. Today, wealthier
individuals can avoid housing conditions that increase risk for every-
thing from asthma to lead exposure. In both instances, socioeconomic
resources are translated into better health, through both the prevention
of disease and the management of health problems.
Fundamental cause theory also predicts that policies that target inter-
vening mechanisms, like smoking bans, may not be able to reduce socio-
economic disparities over the long term (Link and Phelan 1995). Elimi-
nating these more proximate risk factors will do little to weaken the link
between socioeconomic position and health and may even strengthen it
if new risk factors emerge and/or the reduction or elimination of risk
factors occurs differentially by socioeconomic position (Graham 2004).
For example, smoking campaigns have reduced the overall smoking rate,
but the gap between smokers and nonsmokers by educational attainment
has grown dramatically (Link and Phelan 1995). In other cases, new dis-
eases emerge that are driven by different risk factors, which those with
more limited resources are less able to avoid. For example, the emergence
of AIDS over the last twenty years has been patterned by income and
education, both within and between countries (Goesling and Firebaugh
2004).
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But while downstream policy solutions have received considerable
analysis and study, to date there has been very little research on whether
upstream policy solutions have any impact on health. In short, when re-
sources are redistributed, how is health affected? While a range of social
and economic policies could be considered, we look to income support
policy, given that income is a key indicator of socioeconomic status and
given the extensive evidence for the strong association between income
and health, particularly among low-income individuals. Furthermore,
income support programs are arguably the most important mechanisms
through which government influences individual well-being, with bil-
lions of dollars distributed through such programs each year.
Studies of Income and Health
On what basis might we think that income support policy would affect
health? First, there is considerable evidence of a strong association be-
tween income and mortality and morbidity. People with lower incomes
die sooner than do people with higher incomes (Duleep 1986; Duncan
1994; Fox, Goldblatt, and Jones 1985; Haan, Kaplan, and Syme 1989;
Mare 1990; McDonough et al. 1997; Menchik 1993), and they have more
chronic conditions, functional limitations, and higher rates of mental
health problems and generally report a lower health status (House et al.
1994; Kington and Smith 1997; Mirowsky and Ross 2001; Mulatu and
Schooler 2002).
The second reason that income support policies should affect health
is that research in the United States has often found a nonlinear rela-
tionship between income and health, particularly morbidity outcomes.
Although there is some dispute over this nonlinearity, the relationship
to health is clear for those at the bottom of the income distribution,
whereas the evidence is more inconsistent at the top of the income dis-
tribution (Backlund, Sorlie, and Johnson 1996; Bassuk, Berkman, and
Amick 2002; Benzeval, Judge, and Shouls 2001; Ellison 2002; House,
Kessler, and Herzog 1990; House et al. 1994; Martikainen et al. 2001;
McDonough et al. 1997; Norris et al. 2003). Of course, many income
support policies target the poorest Americans, and the extent to which
these policies reduce entrenched poverty also could have implications
for health. Studies have specifically found that the duration of exposure
to poverty or low income matters to health; the more prolonged the
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exposure is, the greater its effect on one’s health will be (Lynch, Kaplan,
and Shema 1997). For example, compared with those in the 1984 Panel
Study of Income Dynamics who had experienced no poverty over the
preceding sixteen years, those who had temporarily experienced poverty
had self-reported health scores that were 17 percent lower, and those
who had persistently experienced poverty had self-reported health scores
that were 32 percent lower (McDonough and Berglund 2003).
What is it about having a low income that is bad for one’s health? Lack
of health insurance surely adversely affects one’s access to and quality of
health care. Even so, health insurance and health care probably account
for, at most, 10 to 20 percent of this relationship (McGinnis, Williams-
Russo, and Knickman 2002). More important than health care and
health insurance is likely the deprivation associated with lower incomes.
Examples of material deprivation include the extent to which poor people
have more difficulty meeting basic needs, such as good nutrition and
safe and healthy home and work environments, which are necessary for
good health (Adler et al. 1994; Stokols 1992; Williams and Collins
1995). For example, low-income children are far more likely to report
food insufficiencies and are more likely to be iron deficient (Alaimo et al.
2001). Asthma onset and deterioration is associated with poor housing
quality (Fullilove and Fullilove 2000; Kreiger and Higgins 2002). Some
studies find that a substantial part of the relationship between low
incomes and health can be explained by deprivation, such as individuals
reporting that they could not afford basic amenities like housing, food,
and clothing (Stronks, van der Mheen, and Mackenbach 1998).
Another important explanation is that low incomes are predictive
of other psychosocial and behavioral risk factors, which, in turn, are
predictive of health (House and Williams 2000). Low-income people are
more likely to face high levels of stress, which play a significant role in
the onset of disease (Adler et al. 1994; Byrne and Whyte 1980; Cohen,
Tyrell, and Smith 1993; Hayward, Pienta, and McLaughlin 1997). One
recent study found a link between high perceived levels of stress and
aging at the cellular level; high stress increased aging by almost ten years
(Epel et al. 2004). Low-income individuals are more socially isolated and
feel they have less control over their lives, both of which are predictive of
poor health (House, Landis, and Umberson 1988; House and Williams
2000; Rodin 1986; Rowe and Kahn 1987; Turner and Noh 1988; Turner
and Marino 1994). Finally, individuals with low incomes are more likely
to smoke, be obese, be sedentary, and consume too much (or too little).
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However, any single set of these factors (e.g., health behaviors, stress,
social relationships and support, or psychological disparities) can account
for just 10 to 20 percent of the association between socioeconomic status
and health (Lantz et al. 1998, 2005; Marmot 2004).
While the potential pathways by which income can influence health
are numerous, the notion that low income has a causal effect on health
is controversial. Some argue that health is a human capital variable
(alongside education, training, and so forth) that determines economic
well-being, not the reverse (Grossman 1972). Health shocks lead to high
out-of-pocket medical expenses, job loss and wage reductions, as well
as changes in consumption behavior, all of which limit the ability to
accumulate income and assets (Lillard and Weiss 1996; Palumbo 1999;
Smith 1999). Alternatively, it has been argued that some other factors
may causally influence both income and health and that the income-
health association is simply spurious. For example, perhaps there are
genetic factors that determine both health and income.
Thus there is a small but growing body of literature examining reverse
causality in the relationship between income and health. Most researchers
conclude that income is likely a determinant of health and that health is
likely a determinant of income, but the strength of the relationship in
either direction is contested (Adams et al. 2003; Adda, Chandola, and
Marmot 2003; Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields 2005; Lindahl
2005; Smith 1999). Sociological, psychological, and biomedical scien-
tists generally conclude that the bulk of the flow is from income to health,
at least in terms of longer-term and more consequential (e.g., mortality,
serious morbidity) physical health outcomes. Economists, however, are
more inclined to emphasize the shorter-term impacts of health on labor
market activity and income.
Exploring the relationship between income support policies and
health may help clarify the relationship between income and health.
Changes in income support policies can represent an exogenous shock,
or natural experiment, thus providing an alternative way to address the
causal direction of the relationship between income and health.
Studies of Income Support Policies and Health
A few studies have examined the influence on health of income sup-
port policies per se, with much of the recent work having tested this
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relationship in the developing world. These latter studies have generally
shown positive health impacts of income supports on poor individuals
(Case 2004; Gertler 2000).1 The few studies conducted in the developed
world, which we detail later, have focused on U.S. social policies and
also have indicated positive, though not unequivocal, impacts of income
support policies on health.
Several studies have concentrated on how income subsidies for low-
income individuals affect birth weight. The first came out of the negative
income tax experiments in the early 1970s, which were developed to ex-
amine the effects of the then proposed Nixon Family Assistance Plan.
The Gary Income Maintenance Experiment was used to study how low
birth weights were affected by the improvements in income (Kehrer and
Wolin 1979). Most of the participants were African American, with a
high concentration of female-headed households. Of the 1,799 partici-
pating families, 1,028 received supplements and 771 were controls. Data
were collected on 104 infants born to the participants between 1970 and
1974. The guarantee levels were equal to the poverty line, but medi-
cal expenses were subtracted from family earnings before applying the
payment formula. Women in the experimental group who had health
characteristics that put them at a high risk for having a low-birth-
weight baby experienced a significant reduction in low-birth-weight
births. These experiments, however, have been criticized for design and
methodological problems, which then called into question the validity
of the findings associated with them (Moffitt 2004).
Currie and Cole (1993) looked at the effect of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) on birth weight in a nonexperimental
design using instrumental variable techniques. They found a positive
and significant effect of participation in AFDC on birth weight for poor
white mothers and a positive and insignificant effect for black mothers.
However, when looking at sibling comparisons to control for unobserved
variable bias, these effects dissipated.
At the other end of the life course, a study by Taubman and Sickles
(1983) examined the effect of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on
the health of elderly beneficiaries. SSI is a means-tested income supple-
ment program for the elderly, blind, and disabled that was implemented
in 1974. The authors used the Retirement History Survey to examine
how the health of elder recipients changed after they started receiving
SSI. They found that SSI had a positive impact on the health of el-
derly beneficiaries. The health of individuals eligible for SSI before its
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implementation was statistically significantly worse than the health of
those not eligible. In both 1975 and 1977, this disparity in heath was
no longer significantly different between these two groups.
To our knowledge, only one study has reported on an income support
policy that had negative health impacts. Snyder and Evans (2006) used
a quasi-experimental design to examine the impact of varying Social
Security benefits on mortality. Errant Social Security legislation led to
a “notch,” with individuals with the exact same work histories born
just before January 1, 1917, receiving higher Social Security benefits
in old age than those born just after this date. Accordingly, the study
compared the mortality rates of those born in the last three months
of 1916 (the experimental group) with those born in the first three
months of 1917 (the control group). The experimental group, whose
Social Security benefits were about 7 percent higher than those of the
control group, despite similar work histories, also had higher mortality
rates after age sixty-five than did the control group. Additional analyses
showed that that the control group that had lower benefits were more
likely to work after retiring, probably to augment their lower benefits.
The authors concluded that this led to more social interaction and thus
lower mortality.
While the use of the notch to help identify the effects of Social Security
on health is novel, some features of this approach also are problematic.
Most important, the study looked at how minimally to modestly higher
Social Security benefits affected the health of wealthier and healthier
individuals. Previous research, however, has shown that the relationship
between income and health is stronger at the bottom, as opposed to the
top, of the income distribution. The evidence regarding the relationship
between income and health at higher income levels is less consistent. A
notch beneficiary retiring at age sixty-two without a high school degree
had just a 1 percent ($5 per month) higher benefit. Moreover, healthier
beneficiaries received larger benefit increases because those retiring at
age sixty-five received larger benefit increases than did those retiring at
age sixty-two, who tend to be sicker than later retirees (Haveman et al.
2003). Those who retired around age sixty-two had a very limited benefit
increase, $7 a month, whereas those retiring at sixty-five had an average
$110 increase. Consequently, this study largely measured the effect of
increases for those who were, on average, wealthier and healthier. Our
study, however, focused specifically on the effects of income supports to
poorer individuals.
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Public Income Supports in Old Age
While these previous studies provide some intriguing findings, more re-
search is clearly needed on whether public income supports affect health.
Old age policy provides a promising avenue for research because income
supports are so substantial among the elderly, especially in comparison
with income supports early in the life course. Social Security, of course,
is the most extensive income support program in the United States, and
it has substantially both increased income levels and reduced poverty
levels among the elderly (Engelhardt and Gruber 2004). Moreover, al-
though some younger individuals are eligible for SSI, unlike the elderly
they must qualify on the basis of disability as well as income. Another
reason that old-age policies provide a promising avenue for research is
that health events are concentrated among older people. It often is dif-
ficult to capture significant levels of variation in health among younger
individuals, especially using standard survey measures of health. Yet,
beyond the work of Taubman and Sickles (1983) and Snyder and Evans
more recently (2006), there has been no direct effort to evaluate the
impact of old-age income supports on health.
Evidence from the Supplemental Security
Income Program
Created in 1972 to provide a minimum income guarantee for the el-
derly, SSI is targeted at the poorest elderly Americans. At that time,
minimum income guarantees varied greatly at the state level. Then
Congress stepped in and established a federal minimum income guaran-
tee, set at about three-quarters of the poverty line. In 2000, the federal
monthly maximum benefit for the elderly under SSI was $512 for single
individuals and $769 for married couples. Overall, about 6 percent of
the elderly receive SSI benefits.
The states, however, can supplement the federal minimum benefit,
and twenty-six states do so. Thus, SSI maximum benefits vary between
states and within states over time. The variation within states over time,
which is the focus of this study, is plausibly exogenous with respect to
individual health or disability. This exogenous variation allows us to test
the impact on disability of changing benefit levels within states over
time.
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How large is the variation within states over time? Table 1 shows
the magnitude of benefit change over the time period examined in
this study, 1990 to 2000. The first two columns in table 1 show the
maximum monthly benefit levels for each state, in year 2000 dollars, for
single individuals in 1990 and 2000. In total, in 1990 and 2000, twenty-
six and twenty-five states, respectively, provided a supplement to the
federal benefit, ranging from just a few dollars to $482 (Connecticut in
1990). The states not included in this table had SSI monthly maximum
benefit levels set at the federal minimum in 1990 and 2000. The benefit
levels in almost all states were well below the poverty threshold in 2000,
which was $688 a month or $8,259 annually.
The third column shows the overall percentage change in benefits
between 1990 and 2000. While some of the percentage changes in
benefits are modest, others are quite substantial. Ten states had annual
changes in benefits of +/− $300, and just nine states had changes smaller
than +/− $100 (column 4). These are substantial amounts relative to
the maximum income levels that individuals can obtain and still be
eligible for SSI (column 5). Moreover, because correlational studies of
income and health indicate that even small differences in income at the
bottom end of the income distribution are correlated with significant
differences in health, it is reasonable to assume that the differences in
income displayed in table 1 could lead to changes in disability.
Overview of the Analysis
We used within-state changes in SSI benefit policy between 1990 and
2000 to examine the effect of the SSI program on disability among el-
derly Americans. Numerous studies have used within-state variation in
maximum SSI benefits to examine its effects on trends in retirement, sav-
ings, and living arrangements among the elderly (Costa 1999; McGarry
and Schoeni 2000; Neumark and Powers 1998, 2000, 2003). We
extended these analyses to look at disability. We look at the relationship
between maximum state SSI benefits and disability outcomes, as op-
posed to the relationship between individual SSI benefits and disability
outcomes for two reasons. First, using the SSI benefit actually received
by an individual, or even the average benefits for a state, would produce
endogeneity problems because SSI benefits are inversely related to labor
force participation and earnings, which are correlated with health. A
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TABLE 1




Maximum in Maximum Dollar Annual
Monthly Monthly Benefit Income
Benefita Benefit: Change: SSI Receipts
1990 to 1990 to Can Have:
1990 2000 2000 2000 2000
Alaska 944 874 −7.4% −841 10488
California 829 692 −16.6% −1650 8304
Colorado 579 548 −5.4% −374 6576
Connecticut 990 747 −24.6% −2919 8964
DC 528 512 −3.0% −189 6144
Hawaii 515 517 0.5% 29 6204
Iowa 508 534 5.1% 312 6408
Idaho 604 565 −6.5% −470 6780
Maine 521 522 0.2% 10 6264
Massachusetts 678 641 −5.5% −444 7692
Michigan 548 526 −3.9% −258 6312
Minnesota 607 593 −2.3% −166 7116
Nebraska 558 519 −7.0% −469 6228
Nevada 555 548 −1.3% −89 6576
New Hampshire 544 539 −0.8% −55 6468
New Jersey 549 543 −1.1% −70 6516
New York 621 599 −3.6% −268 7188
Oklahoma 592 565 −4.6% −328 6780
Oregon 511 514 0.7% 40 6168
Pennsylvania 550 539 −2.0% −134 6468
Rhode Island 592 576 −2.8% −196 6912
South Dakota 528 527 −0.1% −9 6324
Utah 516 512 −0.8% −47 6144
Vermont 591 570 −3.6% −252 6840
Washington 545 539 −1.1% −71 6468
Wisconsin 644 596 −7.4% −572 7152
Wyoming 534 522 −2.3% −148 6264
Federal maximum 508 512 0.8% 48 6144
(i.e., remaining
states)b
Average across 558 544 −2.5% −166 6533
all states
Notes: aThese figures are rounded to the dollar, but annual benefit change reflects changes in
monthly benefits to the cent.
bSSI benefits are automatically adjusted each year to account for inflation. The difference in the
federal minimum benefit between 1990 and 2000 is because the CPI adjuster used for automatic
cost of living increases (for both Social Security and SSI) is different from the CPI adjuster used in
most studies to account for inflation.
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wealth of research shows that poor health limits labor force participation
and earnings (Anderson and Burkhauser 1985; Bound et al. 1999). Thus,
an individual with large SSI benefits would likely be in worse health
than an individual with smaller SSI benefits because the larger one’s SSI
benefit was, the less time that person would have spent in the labor force
during his or her working years. This person’s participation in the labor
force may have been limited by poor health. So the relationship between
the benefit and health outcomes would be confounded by an individual’s
health status before his or her receipt of the benefit.
Another problem pertains to data quality. There is considerable ev-
idence that SSI income—and income at the lowest income percentiles,
for that matter—is misreported in surveys (Bollinger 1998; Huynh,
Rupp, and Sears 2001). The potential for misreports is even higher in
these data because the 1990 census did not explicitly collect informa-
tion about SSI income. Information about SSI income is derived from a
general question about welfare income. These measurement issues also
made us wary of employing instrumental variable techniques (using the
SSI maximum to instrument individual SSI benefits). But we did test
whether the SSI maximum predicts individual SSI benefits and income,
and even if there are errors, this test supports the notion that increases
or decreases in the SSI maximum do affect income. For these reasons,
we focused on maximum state SSI benefits rather than individual SSI
benefits.
The analysis then asked: Do increases in maximum state SSI benefits
affect disability in the elderly? We used census data with state and year
fixed-effect models to examine whether increases in the state maximum
SSI benefit between 1990 and 2000 led to changes in disability. The
substantive rationale for using the maximum state SSI benefit is that
it allowed us to answer directly whether an income support policy
affects disability, which from the perspective of a policy analyst is a
critical question. An added benefit of this approach is that from a policy
perspective, it answers exactly the question facing policymakers: how
will population health be affected if we modify the generosity of the
program?
This approach has some important caveats, however. First, to address
selection effects, our main analysis did not restrict the analysis to SSI
recipients (although we did report sensitivity analyses that do make this
restriction and yield results consistent with our main analysis). Thus,
while we correctly estimated the effects for the population we were
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examining, that is, how changes in maximum SSI benefits would affect
the prevalence of disability among single elderly Americans, our main
analyses did not estimate the effects of changes in maximum SSI benefits
among SSI recipients. Our main analysis approach, commonly used by
scholars studying the effects of welfare programs that pertain to rela-
tively small portions of the population, is preferable for methodological
reasons (Baker and Royalty 2000; Currie and Grogger 2002; Currie and
Gruber 1996; Dooley et al. 2000; Grogger 2003; Hoffman and Foster
2000; Joyce and Kaestner 1996; Lichter, McLaughlin, and Ribar 1997;
McGarry and Schoeni 2000; Moffit 1994; Rosenzweig 1999). Restrict-
ing the analyses to those on SSI leads to biased estimates because changes
in benefit generosity can influence enrollment in the program per se,
which is possible given that only half those eligible for SSI receive it. If
any characteristics of these individuals are correlated with health, this
can be problematic. For example, perhaps an increase in the benefit is
particularly likely to induce healthier people to take up the benefit. So
while it seems that within-state increases in SSI benefits bring improve-
ments in health, it could really be that in the year with higher benefits,
healthier people were more likely to enroll in the program, leading to
an upwardly biased estimate. The reverse also could be possible, which
would produce a downwardly biased estimate. In either case, there is
no way to know for sure whether the composition of the population
receiving SSI benefits between 1990 and 2000 has changed in ways that
would produce biased estimates, so it is safer to avoid analyzing only SSI
recipients. The second problem with focusing on only SSI recipients is
that we did not have accurate estimates of SSI receipt in the U.S. Census.
The 1990 census asked only about welfare income, not SSI specifically.
And in 2000, according to the Social Security Administration, 10 per-
cent of single individuals should have been reporting SSI receipt, but
only 8 percent did report receiving it in the 2000 census.
Finally, a key assumption of this approach is that changes in the
state’s maximum SSI benefits are exogenous to changes in state old-
age disability rates, conditional on changes in sociodemographic and
other factors accounted for in the regression. While not innocuous, this
assumption has been asserted in a series of papers evaluating the effects
of SSI on retirement, savings, and living arrangements (Costa 1999;
McGarry and Schoeni 2000; Neumark and Powers 1998, 2000, 2003).
Moreover, many of the changes in state maximum SSI benefits reflect
neglect rather than deliberate action. That is, the real benefits in several
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TABLE 2




Age (reference = 85+)
65–74 45.2 41.9
75–84 38.4 39.6
Marital status (reference = widowed)
Divorced/separated 13.6 18.4
Never married 11.0 9.7




Years of education (reference = college degree)
Less than high school 48.1 35.3
High school but less than college degree 30.6 36.1
State unemployment rate 3.6 5.8
Institutionalized 9.6 5.5
Proportion receiving SSI 11.1 8.2
Proportion with mobility limitation 28.1 29.9
Proportion with ADL limitation 20.0 16.1
Number of observations 741,172 822,306
states were reduced because they did not adjust their supplements for
inflation.
Data and Samples
The data used in these analyses were drawn from the 5 percent samples
from the 1990 and 2000 censuses as compiled by the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). These are microlevel data from the census
long forms from both years. The questionnaires are self-administered.
The primary focus of this study is single individuals aged sixty-five
or older, and the descriptive statistics of the key variables for this sample
are displayed in table 2. The substantive rationale for focusing on single
individuals is because they are far more likely to be poor and rely on SSI
than married couples are; single individuals comprise 80 percent of all
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SSI beneficiaries (Martin and Davies 2003). In addition, concentrating
the analyses on single individuals helps balance the concerns of endo-
geneity with the reality that a substantial share of the general population
does not receive SSI benefits. A sample restricted to SSI recipients, or
those who are eligible for SSI, would suffer from endogenous sample
selection, whereas a sample that included the entire elderly population
may hide a true relationship if such a relationship existed.
Our main dependent variable is a measure of disability included in
both the 1990 and 2000 censuses. Specifically, the respondent indicated
whether he or she had any health condition that had lasted six or more
months and that made it difficult or impossible to go outside the home
alone. The validity of such self-reported disability measures is supported
by the fact that they independently predict Medicare health spending
and mortality (Ferraro and Farmer 1999; Komisar, McCool-Hunt, and
Feder 1998). At the same time, these measures also are influenced by
socioeconomic factors and the environment (Pope and Tarlov 1991;
Verbrugge and Jette 1994). For example, a higher income may allow
individuals to purchase assistive technology—such as a cane, a walker,
an apartment with an elevator, or a home in a neighborhood that has
curb cuts in the sidewalks—which in turn allows elderly to leave their
homes. Therefore, the effect being estimated may be due to changes
in underlying health or changes in the ability to cope with health
conditions, and data limitations do not allow us to disentangle these
competing pathways.
The predictor variable of primary interest is the maximum state SSI
benefit, which is merged with the microdata for the 1990 and 2000
censuses. All income measures are adjusted for inflation, using the CPI,
to the year 2000. The predictor covariates include age, sex, marital sta-
tus (widowed, divorced, never married), race/ethnicity (Hispanic, non-
Hispanic black, and non-Hispanic white), immigrant status (foreign
born or not), educational attainment (less than high school, high school
but not college graduate, college degree), state unemployment rate, and
institutional status. To control for within-state changes in economic
conditions between 1990 and 2000, the state unemployment rate is
included. Earlier studies have shown a strong connection between un-
employment rates and health, even for the elderly (Ruhm 2000). Insti-
tutional status measures whether an individual lives in an institution.
A living situation is defined as an institution if the individual is in
formally authorized, supervised care or custody in places such as nursing
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homes, hospitals, mental institutions, and jails. Because SSI can be used
to pay for institutional care, it is important to control for this factor.
The last covariates necessary for the fixed-effect models include state of
residence and census year (1990 or 2000).
Changes in all variables between 1990 and 2000 were generally as
expected (table 2). The older population is living longer and becoming
more male, more racially and/or ethnically diverse, and better educated.
The changes for indicators of disability are slightly more mixed but
generally consistent with other data.2
Analytical Approach
The estimation approach identifies the effect of the SSI program through
changes in policies within states over time. The dependent variable has
a value of 1 if an individual i at time t is disabled. The model is
Disabled ist = β0 + β1 Xist + β2SSIMAXst
+ β3STATE is + β4YEARit + u ist
where X is the vector of covariates (including sex, age, race, ethnicity,
immigrant status, educational attainment, state unemployment rates,
and institutional status) for individual i at time t in state s. These
covariates are intended to address factors that may produce a spurious
correlation between SSIMAX and the dependent variable. SSIMAX is
the maximum SSI benefit in state s at time t. STATE represents state fixed
effects, YEAR represents year fixed effects, and uist is the error term.
We reported standard errors for all models that allow for an arbitrary
correlation matrix within states (the so-called Huber-White sandwich
estimator) because of the possibility of serially correlated errors within
states. While the reported analyses were conducted with OLS models,
probit model analyses showed no meaningful differences in the estimated
effects or statistical significance. Thus, for ease of interpretation we
presented the OLS analyses. Weights were employed in all analyses.
Sensitivity Analyses
A variety of sensitivity analyses were performed to test the reliability
of the results. First, we examined two different income subgroups of
22 P. Herd, R.F. Schoeni, and J.S. House
single individuals, those below the twenty-sixth income percentile and
those above the seventy-fourth income percentile, within states.3 The
expectation is that the SSIMAX coefficient would increase in size and
significance when focusing on a poorer population, because high pro-
portions of SSI beneficiaries would be concentrated at the bottom of
the income distribution. Analyses on the entire population of single
individuals should lead to a diluted effect because few higher-income
individuals receive SSI. In contrast, SSIMAX should shrink to insignifi-
cance when examining those above the seventy-fourth income percentile
because this relatively affluent population should not be influenced by
SSI policy. Although not included in the tables, we also tested the effects
for those between the fiftieth and seventy-fifth income percentiles, in
which effects also should not be seen. Finally, we analyzed the 1990 and
2000 data cross sections separately to test whether they confirmed the
time series findings. The results, not shown here, did confirm the time
series findings.
Second, for single individuals, we also performed analyses on an alter-
native dependent variable, one that represents limitations in activities
of daily living (ADL). Specifically, the census ADL measure indicates
whether individuals have difficulty with personal care needs such as
bathing, dressing, and getting around the house.
Third, we conducted a series of analyses to test the strength of the
findings when certain individuals or control variables were included
or excluded. We excluded those individuals in states with the highest
change in benefit levels (Connecticut and California) from the analyses
to confirm that there were no outlier effects. We also excluded those
individuals in states that had no benefit change to confirm that changes
were driven by states with actual changes in benefits. Because the SSI
benefit distribution among the elderly is largely among those not in-
stitutionalized, we also excluded institutionalized individuals from the
analysis as an additional test. For the main analyses, however, we did
not exclude institutionalized individuals because this would likely in-
troduce errors, since the composition of those institutionalized changed
throughout the 1990s. That is, those occupying nursing homes were
much sicker in 2000 than were those in 1990. Fourth, we included
Social Security income as a control. For those at the bottom of the in-
come distribution, Social Security comprises the bulk (more than 90
percent) of their income. Thus, we accounted for other changes in in-
come between 1990 and 2000. Our base analyses did not include this
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variable because of the endogeneity it can introduce. Although not
reported in the table, we also included sensitivity analyses that mea-
sure the effects on only those reporting receiving SSI. The effects were
significant and larger than those reported for individuals below the
twenty-sixth income percentile among both single and married people
(for single people, the coefficient size was 12 percent larger, and for mar-
ried people, it was double the size). But given the reporting problems
in the census and concerns about how the sample of SSI recipients may
have changed over the time period, we considered these estimates to
be much more subject to error and biased than the results of our main
analysis.
The fourth sensitivity analysis tested for effects on married individ-
uals. Because SSI benefit levels and benefit eligibility vary by marital
status, these results must be analyzed separately from those for single in-
dividuals. As stated earlier, we anticipated these estimates to be smaller,
since relatively few married individuals receive SSI. Nonetheless, SSI
should still have an effect on this group.
The fifth set of sensitivity analyses addressed whether the effect of
income supports was lagged. Although some of the effects of increased
income might affect disability in the short term, other effects might
take longer. Examples of short-term effects are immediate spending on
nutrition and housing adaptations, which could substantially help older
people become more mobile. In fact, the PROGRESA experiment in
Mexico showed large health and disability changes over just a two-year
period with increases in income (Gertler 2000). We tested the lagged
effects in two ways. First, we explicitly tested for a five-year lagged
effect by measuring whether maximum SSI benefit changes from 1985
and 1995 were correlated with mobility limitation changes between
1990 and 2000. This test must focus on those aged seventy-five and
older, because those aged sixty-five to seventy-five in 1990 were not on
SSI in 1985. Second, we concentrated on those aged seventy-five and
older (with both the SSI maximum and mobility limitations measured
in 1990 and 2000) who had been on the SSI program longer and thus
should have experienced larger effects than younger individuals did.
Although the second set of results is not shown here, we did find larger
effects for those aged seventy-five and older. Compared with the size of
the effect on those aged sixty-five and older, the effect on those aged
seventy-five and older was 40 percent larger. (The five-year lagged effects
are shown in table 8.)
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The last sensitivity analysis looks at whether other factors were corre-
lated with within-state changes in SSIMAX over time that might lead
to a spurious correlation between SSIMAX and disability. Of partic-
ular concern was that Medicaid eligibility is linked to SSI eligibility.
These results might reflect Medicaid program effects, as opposed to
SSI policies. Changes in SSI benefits automatically lead to changes in
Medicaid eligibility. It is, however, important to keep in mind a few fac-
tors. First, these changes will be problematic for only those individuals
with incomes falling between the SSI federal benefit and the maximum
state benefit. More than 85 percent of SSI beneficiaries in states with
supplements have incomes below the federal maximum (Social Security
Administration 2001). Thus, these individuals would remain eligible
for Medicaid, regardless of whether the state supplement changed. Sec-
ond, almost all these individuals, given their slightly higher incomes,
also receive Social Security benefits and consequent Medicare coverage.
The Medicaid eligibility simply gives them more insurance to supple-
ment their Medicare benefits. Furthermore, every elderly American in
every state can receive some supplemental Medicaid insurance if his or
her income falls below 150 percent of the poverty line. Almost half
the states with supplements provide Medicaid benefits to those whose
incomes fall below 100 percent of the poverty level (keeping in mind
that the state supplement almost never brings these people’s incomes
above the 100 percent poverty level). All states are required through
the Medicare QMB and SLMB programs to provide varying degrees of
coverage, up to the 150 percent of the poverty level. Although these
benefits are not as generous as a full Medicaid supplement, this softens
the effect. All of that said, we still provide additional analyses, using the
Current Population Survey, to examine whether changes in maximum
state SSI benefits between 1992 and 2000 were correlated with changes
in Medicaid participation.4
The other way in which Medicaid may pose a problem is if the gen-
erosity of Medicaid benefits for the elderly was correlated with changes
in maximum SSI benefits within states. We addressed this concern in
two ways. First, we included, as a control variable, logged per capita
(inflation-adjusted) Medicaid spending for the elderly in the years 1992
and 2000 (the only years with available state-level Medicaid spending
data on the elderly). (Table 8 also reports these results.) Second, we
constructed a variable that accounted for changes in Medicaid benefits
relevant to the elderly based on data from 1991 and 2002 (again, the only
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years with available data). In short, the state Medicaid programs must
cover a large set of services, but the states can choose to cover certain
benefits (ranging from podiatry to personal care services), even though
all states covered prescription drug benefits in both 1991 and 2002. The
data on optional state Medicaid benefits were not strictly comparable
across these two years, so we constructed a measure of generosity (offered
benefits/potential offered benefits). This second analysis is not included
in the tables, but the inclusion of this variable did not alter the findings.
Results
The results support the hypothesis that more generous SSI benefit levels
lead to reductions in disability. Table 3 shows the results for all single
individuals and the two subgroups of low- and high-income single indi-
viduals. These findings answer the policy-relevant question of whether
changes in the states’ maximum SSI benefits over time lead to changes
in disability.
Across all models in table 3, the demographic covariates respond
as expected. Being black, female, and older; having low educational
attainment; being an immigrant; and being institutionalized all have
a significant and positive association with disability, as do the state’s
unemployment rates.
The first model in table 3, which includes all single individuals,
shows that the key variable of interest, the SSI monthly state maximum
benefit, is a significant and negative predictor of mobility limitations
for single individuals: the higher the state maximum is, the lower the
rate of disability will be.5 The coefficient shows that a $100 increase
in the maximum monthly SSI benefit leads to a 0.46 percentage point
decline in the probability of having a mobility limitation. Note, however,
that the size of this effect is spread across the entire population of single
elderly Americans, in which just around 10 percent of individuals report
receiving SSI benefits.
Focusing on the population segment that is most likely to be influ-
enced by SSI policy, we limited the sample by examining individuals
below the twenty-sixth income percentile. The size of the effect for this
group increased fourfold, compared with model 1 (which included all
single individuals). This was expected, given that SSI recipients have
very low incomes. In terms of magnitude, the estimate shows that an
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TABLE 3




Maximum monthly state −0.0046∗ −0.0184∗ 0.0011
SSI benefita (0.0019) (0.0075) (0.0023)
Female 0.0392∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0440∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0024) (0.0016)
Age (reference = 85+)
65–74 −0.3061∗∗∗ −0.2233∗∗∗ −0.3795∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0043) (0.0044)
75–84 −0.1982∗∗∗ −0.1328∗∗∗ −0.2564∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0031)
Marital status (reference = widowed)
Divorced −0.0030∗∗ −0.0049∗ −0.0088∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Never married −0.0020 0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0255∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0020)
Race/ethnicity (reference = white)
Black 0.0505∗∗∗ 0.0349∗∗∗ 0.0540∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0042)
Hispanic 0.0382∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0074) (0.0081)
Immigrant 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0049)
Years of education (reference = college degree)
Less than high school 0.1074∗∗∗ 0.0682∗∗∗ 0.1370∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0027)
High school but less 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0526∗∗∗
than college degree (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0018)
State unemployment rate 0.0044∗∗ 0.0068∗ 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0013)
Institutionalized 0.5002∗∗∗ 0.5136∗∗∗ 0.4213∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0120)
Year 2000 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0437∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0017)
Mean of dependent variable 0.29 0.40 0.23
Number of observations 1,563,910 376,616 413,015
Notes: aParameter estimates multiplied times 100.
All models include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses: ∧p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01,∗∗∗p < .001.
increase of $100 in the maximum monthly state SSI benefit leads to a
1.8 percentage point decline (from 39 to 37.2 percent) in the probability
of having a mobility limitation among these low-income individuals.
In column 3, the sample is limited to those above the seventy-fourth
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income percentile. By examining the population who would be well out-
side the eligibility guidelines for SSI, we would expect to see no effect of
SSI. Indeed, this is what happened: the coefficient on SSI monthly state
maximum is substantively small and no longer statistically significant.
Although not presented in the table, the effects also were insignificant
for those between the fiftieth and seventy-fifth income percentiles.
Further sensitivity analyses ruled out additional concerns. First, find-
ings using ADL limitation as the dependent variable generally corrob-
orated the findings with mobility limitations as the dependent variable
(see table 4). When all single individuals were included in the sample,
the maximum monthly state SSI benefit was not significant, although the
coefficient was negative. When focusing on those below the twenty-sixth
income percentile, the maximum state SSI benefit became marginally
significant and the coefficient tripled in size. For every $100 increase
in the monthly maximum state SSI benefit, the probability of having
an ADL limitation dropped by 1.2 percentage points. And as expected,
when narrowing the sample to those above the seventy-fourth income
percentile and those between the fiftieth and seventy-fifth income per-
centiles (not reported in table 4), the maximum SSI benefit was no longer
statistically significant or substantively meaningful.
Table 5 shows an array of other sensitivity analyses. The results are
based on all single individuals over age sixty-five as well as those be-
low the twenty-sixth income percentile, and the dependent variable
measures mobility limitations. Columns 1 and 2 display results that ex-
clude California and Connecticut from the analyses. Connecticut has the
largest supplement, and these two states had the largest decrease in SSI
benefits between 1990 and 2000. Compared with the original model in
table 4, the coefficients are larger, which suggests that the results were
not influenced by outliers. For all single individuals, the percentage
point reduction in mobility limitation for every $100 increase in the
maximum SSI benefit was 1.66, compared with 0.046 in the original
model, and among those below the twenty-sixth income percentile, the
percentage point reduction was 3.06, compared with 1.84 in the original
model. Columns 3 and 4 give results that excluded the institutionalized
population from the analyses. For all single individuals, the estimated
effect of a $100 increase in SSI monthly benefits was a percentage point
decline in mobility limitations of 0.29, compared with 0.46 in the
original model. But when focused on those below the twenty-sixth in-
come percentile, the effect size was 1.81 percentage points, which is
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TABLE 4




Maximum monthly state −0.0039 −0.0122∧ 0.0001
SSI benefita (0.0033) (0.0074) (0.0017)
Male 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0013)
Age (reference = 85+)
65–74 −0.1858∗∗∗ −0.1488∗∗∗ −0.2296∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0045)
75–84 −0.1281∗∗∗ −0.0956∗∗∗ −0.1667∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Marital status (reference = widowed)
Divorced −0.0003 −0.0024 −0.0046∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0015)
Never married 0.0005 0.0089∗∗ −0.0157∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0014)
Race/ethnicity (reference = white)
Black 0.0594∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0029)
Hispanic 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0038)
Immigrant 0.0165∗∗ 0.0147∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0036)
Years of education (reference = college degree)
Less than high school 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0427∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0018)
High school but less 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗
than college degree (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0015)
State unemployment rate −0.0006 0.0005 −0.00002
(0.0016) (0.0037) (0.0010)
Institutionalized 0.5470∗∗∗ 0.5593∗∗∗ 0.4458∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0141)
Year 2000 −0.0293∗∗∗ −0.0504∗∗∗ −0.0144
(0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0016)
Mean of dependent variable 0.19 0.29 0.13
Number of observations 1,563,910 376,616 413,015
Notes: aParameter estimates multiplied times 100.
All models include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses: ∧p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
very similar to the estimated effect of 1.84 percentage points when the
institutionalized are included.
The next two columns show the results when those states without
a supplement were excluded from the analyses. Compared with the
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original analyses, the percentage point reductions in mobility limitations
were the same as or slightly smaller (0.47 and 1.68), and the standard
errors were just slightly bigger, but the substantive conclusion, that
higher SSI benefits lead to lower disability, was the same. The last
column includes the amount of Social Security income received by the
individual. This sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the inclusion of
Social Security income has almost no impact on the results. In sum,
all these tests on single individuals continue to support the finding
that within-state changes in the state SSI maximum predict changes in
mobility limitations.
Although our analyses focus on single individuals, because they com-
prise the large majority of SSI recipients, some married individuals do
receive SSI. Table 6 shows the findings for married individuals. As ex-
pected, the effects were much smaller than those for single individuals.
For example, for all single individuals the percentage point reduction
was 0.46, and for all married individuals the percentage point reduction
was 0.20. And for those below the twenty-sixth income percentile, the
percentage point reduction was 1.84 for single people, compared with
0.40 for married individuals. Although not reported in the table, the
effects for those who reported receiving SSI were significant, and the
percentage point reduction was 0.9 for married couples. Finally, as with
single individuals, there was no significant relationship between the SSI
maximum and mobility limitations for married individuals above the
seventy-fourth income percentile or between the fiftieth and seventy-
fifth income percentile (the latter results are not reported in table 6).
Table 7 shows the results from tests of whether the effects of SSI
policy on disability were due to associated increases in Medicaid receipt.
Although the OLS results are presented, the probit analyses produced no
meaningful differences in the estimated effects or statistical significance.
Analyses using the March Current Population Survey (CPS) demonstrate
that within-state changes in the SSI maximum over the 1990s were not
correlated with within-state changes in Medicaid receipt. Other anal-
yses (not included here) examined the relationship between SSI state
maximums and administrative Medicaid data (in aggregate state partic-
ipation by age). Similar to the self-reported data in the CPS, there was
no evidence of a relationship. As stated earlier, these results are not sur-
prising, given the very small percentage of individuals who might not
receive Medicaid as a supplement to their Medicare owing to changes in
SSI benefits.
32 P. Herd, R.F. Schoeni, and J.S. House
TABLE 6





Maximum monthly state −0.0020∗ −0.0040∧ −0.0015
SSI benefita (0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0010)
Male 0.01643∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0009)
Age (reference = 85+)
65–74 −0.2058∗∗∗ −0.1885∗∗∗ −0.2086∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0047)
75–84 −0.1287∗∗∗ −0.1071∗∗∗ −0.1412∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0045)
Living with spouse −0.0963∗∗∗ −0.1108∗∗∗ −0.0677∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0076) (0.0050)
Race/ethnicity (reference = white)
Black 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0032)
Hispanic 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0077)
Immigrant 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0030)
Years of education (reference = college degree)
Less than high school 0.0815∗∗∗ 0.0504∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0026)
High school but less 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗
than college degree (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0013)
State unemployment rate 0.0028 0.0048 −0.0025
(0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0018)
Institution 0.4779∗∗∗ 0.4461∗∗∗ 0.4407∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0096) (0.0201)
Year 2000 0.0399∗∗∗ 0.0382∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0035) (0.0014)
Mean of dependent variable 0.15 0.25 0.09
Number of observations 1,927,951 482,623 481,797
Notes: aParameter estimates on SSI maximum multiplied by 100.
All models include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses: ∧p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
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TABLE 7
Medicaid Participation Regressed on SSI Maximum State Benefit
for Single Individuals
Coefficient














Years of education −0.0210∗∗∗
(0.0016)




Number of observations 15,393
Notes: aParameter estimates on SSI maximum multiplied by 100.
All models include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses: ∧p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
Table 8 includes two final sets of sensitivity analyses. The first two
columns report, for all single individuals and those below the twenty-
sixth income percentile, the effect of including logged per capita Med-
icaid spending on the elderly. This variable was not significant and
produced no change in the SSI maximum coefficient. As already stated,
a variable that looked at changes in optional state Medicaid benefits also
produced no significant effect or change in the SSI maximum coeffi-
cient. The last two columns report the five-year lagged effect for single
individuals and those below the twenty-sixth income percentile. Indeed,
the size of the effect almost doubled for the full sample of single people
and those below the twenty-sixth income percentile.
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TABLE 8
Mobility Limitation Regressed on Maximum State SSI Benefit
for Single Individuals
Controlling for
Changes in Lagged SSI
Medicaid Spending Benefits (5 Years)
<=25th <=25th
Income Income
All Percentile All Percentile
Maximum monthly −0.0046∗ −0.0178∗ −0.0108∧ −0.0312∗∗∗
state SSI benefita (0.0019) (0.0076) (0.0045) (0.0081)
Male 0.0392∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0492∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0022)
Age (reference = 85+)
65–74 −0.3061∗∗∗ −0.2233∗∗∗ (dropped) (dropped)
(0.0028) (0.0043)
75–84 −0.1982∗∗∗ −0.1328∗∗∗ −0.1951∗∗∗ −0.1353∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0024)
Marital status (reference = widowed)
Divorced −0.0030∗ −0.0049∗ −0.0132 −0.0165∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0034)
Never married −0.0020 0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0241 −0.0038
(0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0034)
Race/ethnicity (reference = white)
Black 0.0505∗∗∗ 0.0349∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0060)
Hispanic 0.0382∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.0279∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0074) (0.0090) (0.0056)
Immigrant 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0098∧
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0050)
Years of education (reference = college degree)
Less than high school 0.1074∗∗∗ 0.0682∗∗ 0.1019∗∗∗ 0.0506∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0032)
High school but less 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0425∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
than college degree (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0034)
State unemployment rate 0.0044∗∗ 0.0068∗ 0.0031 0.0082
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0050)
Institutionalized 0.5002∗∗∗ 0.5136∗∗∗ 0.4682∗∗∗ 0.4819∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0065) (0.0054)
Year 2000 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0037)
Logged per capita Medicaid 0.0002 −0.0027
spending on the elderly (0.0013) (0.0017)
Mean of dependent variable 0.29 0.40 0.39 0.49
Number of observations 376,616 376,616 959,823 260,759
Notes: aParameter estimates on SSI maximum multiplied by 100.
All models include state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses: ∧p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
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Finally, welfare policy reforms in 1996 could have produced erroneous
results in our analyses. When the welfare reform initiative was launched,
legal immigrants (resident aliens) who were not citizens lost access to
public welfare benefits. This legislation was altered in 1997, however,
to grandfather in those individuals who were receiving SSI benefits
before the 1996 legislation. Nonetheless, these changes likely did have
some impact on immigrants’ participation in SSI and thus where they
fell in the income distribution between 1990 and 2000. Including or
excluding immigrants in the analysis, however, had little impact on the
results (estimates not shown in tables).
Summary and Discussion
Do income support policies, particularly those focused on the poorest
elderly Americans, reduce old-age disability? The findings from this
study support the hypothesis that between 1990 and 2000, within-
state changes in the maximum state SSI benefit did lead to changes
in disability among elderly individuals. Higher benefits were linked
to lower disability rates. Among all single elderly individuals, a $100
increase in the maximum monthly SSI benefit led the rate of mobility
limitations to fall by 0.46 percentage points. Because about 10 percent
of single individuals receive SSI benefits, this effect could be as much as
ten times this size for SSI recipients.
The findings were robust to varying sensitivity analyses. First, samples
limited to individuals most likely to receive SSI benefits produced larger
effects, and samples limited to individuals least likely to receive SSI
benefits produced no measurable effect. Second, varying the disability
measure did not meaningfully alter the findings. Third, excluding the
institutionalized population, immigrants, individuals living in states
with very large benefit changes, and individuals living in states with
no supplements did not change the substantive conclusions. Fourth,
Medicaid did not appear to confound the effects. Finally, these results
were robust for married individuals.
We are hesitant to draw strong conclusions about the size of the
effect until further studies are done. Nonetheless, it is important to say
something about the plausibility of the effect size that we did find.
We estimate that the effect size for SSI recipients could range up to a
4.6 percentage point reduction for a $100 increase in monthly benefit,
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which is essentially an 11 percent reduction in mobility limitations
for around a 15 to 20 percent change in income.6 It is difficult to
make comparisons with other studies, in part because the measures are
different and in part because there is little to no agreement in the
literature on the magnitude of the effects of income on disability or
health. Moreover, many of the existing studies do not take into account
the nonlinear effects of income on health, that is, that the effects of
income may be larger for lower-income people, further limiting our
ability to make comparisons across studies. One true income experiment
among the poor elderly is PROGRESA, which was conducted in Mexico
in the late 1990s, with about one in nine Mexican households receiving
PROGRESA benefits, which increased their income by about 20 percent
(Gertler 2000). That study found that for those aged fifty and older, the
20 percent increase in income led to about a 20 percent reduction in the
number of days reported having difficulty completing normal activities
of daily living. Thus, the effect in Mexico was bigger (about double),
although obviously poverty is much more severe in Mexico and we should
expect a larger effect. However, this study does provide some evidence
that the magnitude of the effect we estimated among poor elderly in the
United States is plausible.
From a theoretical perspective, this study provides evidence support-
ing the potential for upstream solutions to socioeconomic disparities
in health. Fundamental cause theory would predict that by shifting re-
sources to those at the bottom, income supports would improve health.
But most policy efforts to improve the population’s health have fo-
cused on downstream solutions, particularly attempts to expand access to
health care through varying health policy mechanisms.7 While these are
by no means ineffectual strategies, they likely are incomplete (Graham
2004). The continuing socioeconomic disparities in health in countries
with universal access to health care make this clear. This study reveals
the potentially beneficial impact on disability of increasing income sup-
ports, particularly among the poorest Americans, as an alternative or
supplemental strategy for improving their health.
There are some important caveats to these findings, however. First, to
address selection effects, we did not restrict the analysis to SSI recipients.
Thus, although we correctly estimated the effects on the population
we examined, that is, how changes in maximum SSI benefits would
affect disability prevalence among single elderly Americans, we were
not looking at how increasing SSI benefits affected specific individuals
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receiving those benefits. While the quality of self-reported SSI income
data and the potential for endogeneity make our approach preferable,
logic and sensitivity analyses that include only SSI recipients suggest
that the effect would be larger in this group, but by an amount that is
impossible to estimate precisely with the available data.
Second, a key assumption of this study is that changes in state SSI
policies are exogenous to changes in state old-age disability rates, con-
ditional on changes in sociodemographic and other factors in the state
accounted for in the regression. While examining within-state changes
in SSI maximum benefits over time (or generally the use of state and year
fixed-effect models) is a relatively common methodological answer to
concerns about endogeneity, a potential weakness with the state and year
fixed-effect model is that there could be unobserved covariates correlated
with within-state changes in maximum SSI benefits. Such unobserved
covariates could produce a spurious relationship between SSI and func-
tional limitations among the elderly. In this case, we were concerned that
changes in SSI eligibility could be correlated with changes in Medicaid
receipt for the elderly. But we found no evidence for this.
While our findings are quite robust, further analyses are needed to
confirm their reliability. Future research should examine a variety of
different income support policies. Aside from SSI, there are numerous
other income support policies, from the Earned Income Tax Credit to
Social Security, that could be studied. But it also is clear that we need
better data to conduct these studies. Few data sources include extensive
information on both income and health, particularly in a longitudinal
framework. And longitudinal surveys that track outcomes before and
after a new policy change or that are experimental in nature often fail to
collect extensive information on health. For example, while some surveys
were created as part of evaluations of negative income tax policies in
the 1970s and welfare reform in the mid- to late 1990s, these studies
largely focused on economic well-being and labor force participation.
An exception is the work by Bitler and Hoynes (Forthcoming), who
used the available measures collected in welfare evaluations to examine
the effects of welfare reforms on health.
More broadly, further research is needed on the question of whether
(and how) social and economic policies affect health. The United States
spends nearly twice as much on health care as other industrialized coun-
tries do, but on basic health measures the United States lags well behind.
While most would agree that medical care, and access to that care, is
38 P. Herd, R.F. Schoeni, and J.S. House
an important predictor of good health, it is becoming increasingly clear
that medical care is not the only or even the primary predictor of good
health. Thus, recent research that concentrates on connections between
social and economic factors and health sets the stage for analyses like
ours, which explicitly explore whether there are connections between
social and economic policies and health. Ultimately, if public policy is
to play a role in improving population health, we must have a clearer
understanding of the different ways in which it can do so.
Endnotes
1. One of the most important studies of the relationship between income and health in the elderly
is a true experiment conducted in Mexico in the late 1990s (Gertler 2000). Under an income
support experiment, entitled PROGRESA, the Mexican government has been providing about
$800 million in aid to 2.6 million rural families, almost one-third of all rural families. The
results showed striking improvements in health for children, adults, and those over age fifty.
Those over age fifty whose only requirement for participation was a yearly preventive checkup
had significant reductions in activity limitations owing to illness, fewer days bedridden due
to sickness, and a more general increase in energy levels as measured by their ability to walk
distances without significant fatigue. Children and adults also showed improved outcomes. But
the independent effect of income on the children’s health due to the medical care requirements
linked to the receipt of income benefits could not be proved. Of course, the limitation of this
study is the fact that it was conducted in a developing country, and it is unclear whether the
results are applicable to a wealthier country.
2. Although most studies have found that overall disability rates in the elderly have improved
over this time period (Freedman, Martin, and Schoeni 2002), this is not true for every disability
measure. For example, while the mobility limitation prevalence increased slightly between
1990 and 2000, the ADL disability declined. Comparisons with analogous disability measures
in the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) showed trends similar to what we found
in the census. That is, ADL disability rates in the MCBS fell during this period, and although
it has no question exactly like the mobility measure in the census, some measures of mobility
in the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (including the ability to walk one-quarter of a mile
unaided) worsened over this period. Therefore, the trends in disability and limitation in the
census are not inconsistent with evidence from other national surveys.
3. The income percentiles were measured within states to ensure that the populations were similar
within states between 1990 and 2000. For households with multiple persons, household income
was used but then adjusted to account for household size.
4. The 1992 Current Population Survey (CPS) was used because questions regarding type of health
insurance did not appear in the 1990 or 1991 CPS.
5. Separate analyses of the 1990 and 2000 data not including state fixed effects show that higher
SSI state maximum benefits were associated with lower probabilities of mobility limitations.
For every $100 increase in the SSI state maximum, there was a .008 and .010 reduction in the
probability of having a mobility limitation in 1990 and 2000, respectively.
6. Dividing the mobility limitation percentage point change among all single people by the percent
receiving SSI (.46/.10) equals 4.6 percentage points. The approximate mobility limitation rate
among the SSI population is 40 percent (it is 40 percent whether we look at those reporting
SSI or those reporting below the twenty-sixth income percentile). This is about an 11 percent
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reduction for a $100 increase in the maximum benefit, or between a 15 percent and 20 percent
increase in income among the very poorest elderly Americans (generally those falling below 90
percent of the poverty level).
7. Although to the extent that expanded access to health insurance reduces out-of-pocket costs,
this too could be in the spirit of an upstream solution.
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